Elder Fraud in the AI Era

Executive brief

AI makes fraud more convincing. The basic playbook has not changed.

Families do not need to become AI experts to protect one another. They do need a plan for the moment when a call, message, or investment pitch creates urgency. Today’s tools can produce a familiar voice, a plausible photo, and a polished personal story in minutes. That makes old warning signs, such as bad grammar or a voice that sounds slightly wrong, less dependable. It does not change the final step. The person behind the scam still needs someone to send money, share a code, reveal a password, or allow remote access.¹³⁶⁷

A strong response does not depend on spotting a deepfake. It adds time, a trusted contact, and a second channel before money or access moves.

What AI changes

Voice cloning can make an emergency call sound familiar. Generated images and video can give a false profile or investment pitch a face. Translation and writing tools can clean up awkward scripts. Public data can make the story feel personal. These changes weaken familiar clues and let one operation contact many more people with tailored messages.¹³⁶⁷

What it does not change

Fraud still needs a decision that benefits the scammer. The request may be for a wire, gift card, cryptocurrency transfer, one-time code, password, or remote access. Pressure, authority, secrecy, and isolation still create the opening. A pause and an independently sourced contact method still take control of the evidence away from the person making the request.

The losses are serious. Age is not the explanation.

Reports from people age 60 and older show very large losses, including thousands of complaints above $100,000. That deserves a clear response, not a story that treats older adults as naturally gullible. FTC data show that older adults report losing money to fraud less often than younger adults. When a loss is reported, however, it is often larger. Exposure, available assets, irreversible payment methods, and isolation under pressure all matter. So does the fact that complaint systems capture only part of what happens.¹²⁴

A useful family role is to be a safe second channel when an unexpected request creates pressure. The goal is not to watch every move or take over. Support should make it easier to pause and check while the older adult stays part of the decision.

The report recommends three moves:

1. Pause when an unexpected interaction asks for money, a code, a password, or access.
2. Verify another way using a number, app, or website you already trust.
3. Share the request with someone you trust before acting, and without shame if something already happened.

Scope and evidence

Three reporting systems show different parts of the problem

No single federal dataset counts all fraud. This report keeps the systems separate and uses each for the question it can answer.

1. FBI IC3: cyber-enabled crime complaints. IC3 counts complaints and adjusted reported losses submitted to the FBI. Its 60+ section is the newest detailed national view for 2025.¹
2. FTC Consumer Sentinel: consumer fraud reports. Sentinel compares reporting patterns by age and includes reports where no money was lost. It shows lower loss-reporting rates but higher median reported losses among older adults.²
3. FinCEN Bank Secrecy Act reporting: financial-institution suspicion. This system captures suspicious activity reported by banks and other financial institutions. The amounts are not the same as confirmed consumer losses.⁵

In this report, older adult is the default. Elder fraud and elder financial exploitation are used when referring to established FBI, DOJ, FinCEN, or regulatory terminology. Financial exploitation can involve a stranger or a person the older adult knows.⁵¹³

Evidence discipline

• Reported complaints are not a prevalence estimate; many events are never reported.
• Categories can overlap. Cryptocurrency and AI-related labels may describe how a crime was facilitated, not a separate crime type.
• Victims may not know whether AI was involved, so AI-related complaint counts are likely incomplete.
• Reported losses, suspicious activity, and adjudicated losses are different measures and are not combined here.

The reported scale

Reported losses grew faster than complaint volume

IC3 received 201,266 complaints from people age 60+ in 2025, 37% more than in 2024. Adjusted reported losses reached $7.748 billion, 59% more than the prior year.¹¹⁹

The gap between complaint growth and loss growth matters. IC3 reports that 12,444 complainants age 60+ lost more than $100,000 in 2025.¹

Where reported losses concentrate

In 2025 IC3 complaints filed by people age 60+, investment complaints accounted for $3.519 billion in reported losses. Tech and customer support followed at $1.041 billion. Cryptocurrency was tracked separately as a descriptor and appeared in $4.347 billion of reported 60+ losses, so it should not be added to the categories below.¹

IC3 recorded 3,143 AI-related complaints from people age 60+ with $352.5 million in reported losses. Across all ages, it recorded 22,364 AI-related complaints and $893.3 million in losses. Because complainants may not know whether AI was used, these figures should be read as identified AI references, not a complete count of AI-enabled fraud.¹

A necessary correction

FTC data show that older adults reported losing money to fraud at a lower rate than younger adults. When a loss was reported, however, the median loss was higher, especially for people age 80 and older.²

A better risk model considers four things:

• Exposure. Scammers can reach anyone through calls, texts, email, social media, search ads, and pop-ups.
• Available assets. Retirement savings, home equity, and accumulated balances can make a successful event more costly.
• Irreversible rails. Cryptocurrency, cash, wires, and gold can turn one pressured decision into a hard-to-recover loss.⁴
• Isolation under pressure. High-loss imposter scams often aim to keep the person on the phone and away from a second opinion.⁴

The evidence supports a respectful defense that adds time, independent verification, and trusted connection around high-risk actions. It does not support removing independence from everyday decisions.

What AI changes

AI can make a false story faster to produce and easier to believe. It cannot complete the fraud on its own. Money, a code, a password, or access still has to move through a real channel.¹³

Four capabilities make old fraud easier to scale

The FBI describes AI-generated text, images, audio, and video as tools that can increase believability while reducing the time and effort required to create deceptive content.³

1. Polish. Fluent language, cleaner formatting, and faster translation remove familiar warning signs such as awkward grammar.
2. Personalization. Public data and stolen information can be woven into a tailored story, profile, or message.
3. Synthetic presence. Cloned audio, generated images, and deepfake video can imitate family members, officials, or advisers.
4. Scale and persistence. One operation can maintain many distinct conversations, vary scripts, and produce new content quickly.

The scam still needs a decision that benefits the fraudster: send money, reveal a one-time code, enter credentials, install remote-access software, or keep the request secret.³⁶⁷

Where AI enters the encounter

It helps to separate the parts AI can improve from the moments when a household or institution can still interrupt what is happening.

Pause interrupts pressure. Verify another way breaks the sender’s control of the channel. Share breaks isolation before the transfer.¹³⁴⁶

A familiar voice is no longer proof of identity

The FBI and FTC warn that a short audio sample can be used to create a convincing imitation of a loved one. In 2025, IC3 recorded more than $5 million in losses to distress scams with a reported AI nexus.¹⁶

If an unexpected caller sounds like family and asks for immediate money:

1. End the call, even when the story feels urgent.
2. Call the person on a number you already know.
3. If they do not answer, contact another family member.
4. Use a private family phrase that is not posted online.

Independent verification works whether the voice was cloned, the caller was a skilled impersonator, or the emergency was genuine. The response does not depend on identifying the technology.

AI-generated video and audio can also imitate celebrities, executives, government officials, or investment professionals. Regulators recommend checking registration and contacting the real organization through independently sourced information before moving money or securities.⁷¹⁸

Do not make AI detection the consumer’s job

You do not have to decide whether a message, image, or voice was made with AI. You only have to notice when an unexpected interaction asks you to act before you can verify.

No legitimate bank, government agency, or company needs you to move money to a new account, cryptocurrency kiosk, courier, or pile of gold to keep it safe.⁴¹⁴¹⁷

Defense by design

The goal is not constant suspicion. It is a small set of household and institutional defaults that add time, a trusted channel, and another person around high-risk actions.

Pause. Verify another way. Share.

The response is intentionally simple enough to use under pressure and broad enough to work across calls, texts, email, physical mail, social media, and AI-generated content.³⁶¹⁵

1. Pause. Stop the interaction. Pressure is the cue to slow down, not proof that the request is real. Do not click, reply, read a code, install software, or send money.
2. Verify another way. Leave the channel the sender controls. Use a saved number, official app, trusted statement, or website you type yourself. Do not use a callback number, link, QR code, or search ad supplied by the interaction.
3. Share. Bring in a trusted person before a high-risk action. A calm second person breaks secrecy and sees the story from outside the pressure. For a loved one, lead with thanks and help, not shame.

“Another way” matters because asking the same caller to prove who they are keeps verification inside the attacker’s channel. Independent verification changes who controls the evidence.

A one-time household setup can protect everyday independence

Good fraud defense lives in defaults. Set these up during a calm moment, with the older adult making the choices.

1. Choose a trusted check-in person. Decide who to contact before sending money, codes, or account access in response to an unexpected request.
2. Create a private family phrase. Use something memorable that is not a birthday, pet name, or detail posted online.³⁷
3. Save official contact routes. Store bank, card, brokerage, and key family numbers. Use statements or official apps, not inbound links.
4. Turn on account alerts. Enable alerts for transfers, withdrawals, password changes, new payees, and new devices where available.
5. Adopt a two-person rule. For an unexpected request above a household-selected threshold, pause until a second trusted person reviews it.
6. Name the non-negotiables. No one-time codes, remote access, safe-account transfers, gift cards, crypto kiosks, or couriers in response to surprise contact.

Ask a bank, credit union, or brokerage what trusted-contact, notification, transaction-hold, and exploitation-response options it offers. A trusted contact does not automatically gain authority over the account.⁸⁹

Connection without takeover

Scammers benefit when people feel embarrassed or fear losing control. Family systems should make it easier to ask for a second opinion while keeping the older adult at the center of the decision.

• Thank the pause: “Good call checking. Let’s look at it together.”
• Verify with, not for: open the official app or call a known number together whenever possible.
• Separate support from surveillance: agree in advance which alerts are helpful and who sees them.
• Act before lecturing: if money or access moved, contact the provider first. Review warning signs later.
• Never shame: anyone can be targeted. Shame reduces future disclosure and helps recovery scammers.

Elder financial exploitation also includes theft or misuse by relatives, caregivers, fiduciaries, or other trusted people. If that is suspected, use local Adult Protective Services, law enforcement, and legal resources rather than confronting the suspected person alone.⁵¹³

For institutions and communities

Financial institutions, senior-serving organizations, libraries, and caregiver programs can reduce the burden on individuals by building independent verification and human connection into the environment.

1. Detect patterns, not age. Monitor unusual transfers, new payees, account-takeover signals, abrupt behavior changes, and high-risk payment rails. Do not treat age alone as proof of incapacity.
2. Offer trusted-contact options. Make designation clear, revocable, and separate from transactional authority. Explain when contact may occur.⁸⁹
3. Add proportionate friction. Use callbacks, holds, escalation, or a second review for unusual high-risk transactions while preserving normal access.
4. Prepare the response path. Train staff on escalation, suspicious activity reporting, Adult Protective Services, law enforcement, and victim-centered communication.⁵⁹

FinCEN identified 155,415 elder-financial-exploitation-related BSA filings covering roughly $27 billion in suspicious activity over one year. About 80% of the filings involved elder scams and about 20% involved elder theft. This is suspicious activity reported by institutions, not confirmed consumer loss.⁵

If something happened

Act quickly, preserve evidence, and avoid the second scam

A fast, calm response may limit damage. Recovery depends on how the money or access moved, so start with the financial or technology provider involved.¹⁰

1. Contact the provider now. Call the bank, card issuer, wire service, payment app, brokerage, gift-card issuer, mobile carrier, or delivery service. Ask whether the transaction, transfer, package, or account change can be stopped or reversed.
2. Secure exposed access. Change exposed passwords, contact the phone carrier after a SIM takeover, remove remote-access software, run a security scan, and review accounts for changes.
3. Preserve the record. Save messages, envelopes, receipts, phone numbers, transaction IDs, wallet addresses, account details, and the timeline. Do not keep engaging with the scammer.
4. Report through the right channels. Use ReportFraud.ftc.gov and IC3.gov. Use IdentityTheft.gov when personal information was misused. The National Elder Fraud Hotline is 833-372-8311.¹⁰¹¹¹²
5. Watch for recovery fraud. Scammers may impersonate law firms, agencies, or recovery specialists and ask for upfront money. Independently verify any offer to recover funds.¹

If there is an immediate threat of physical harm, call 911. For suspected abuse or exploitation by a known person, contact local Adult Protective Services or law enforcement.¹³

Put the report into practice

KinKeeper’s free Elder Fraud & Scam Protection Playbook uses realistic, fictional scenarios to practice the same response across texts, email, physical mail, AI-enabled calls, relationship scams, money requests, and recovery.¹⁵

• Chapters 1 and 6: Pressure and personalization. Practice recognizing urgency, authority, secrecy, and personal details that are not proof.
• Chapters 2 and 3: Texts, email, and mail. Choose an independent route for bank alerts, delivery fees, government notices, and donations.
• Chapters 4 and 5: AI voices and access. Respond to a familiar-sounding emergency, one-time-code requests, and remote-access demands.
• Chapters 8 and 9: Connection and recovery. Help without shame and act quickly when money or access has already moved.
• Chapter 10: Household plan. Choose concrete actions for a trusted person, family phrase, saved numbers, alerts, and reporting.

The Playbook is free, private by default, and requires no sign-up. It and KinKeeper’s fraud tools are educational and alerting resources. They cannot prevent or guarantee protection from scams.

Research method and limitations

How this report was researched

1. Evidence window. Sources were reviewed through July 15, 2026. The newest complete federal reporting period available was 2025 for FBI IC3 data and 2024 for the FTC older-consumer annual report.
2. Source selection. Primary federal sources were preferred: FBI IC3, FTC Consumer Sentinel, FinCEN BSA analysis, CFPB, DOJ, and joint securities-regulator guidance. KinKeeper material was used only for the companion framework and course mapping.
3. Data treatment. IC3, FTC, and FinCEN figures were kept separate because they measure different reporting channels and concepts. Dollar amounts were rounded only where the source itself used rounded values.
4. Editorial review. Claims were checked against the source ledger. High-volatility facts, reporting routes, and product availability are scheduled for quarterly review.

Limitations

• Complaint systems substantially undercount fraud and are influenced by awareness, access, reporting behavior, and contributor practices.
• Reported loss is not the same as verified adjudicated loss, and suspicious activity is not the same as confirmed victim loss.
• AI involvement is difficult for complainants to observe. Identified AI-related complaints are not a complete count of AI-enabled fraud.
• The category “age 60+” covers a large and diverse population. It should not be treated as one risk profile.
• This report is educational, not legal, investment, financial, cybersecurity, or law-enforcement advice.

The next scheduled review is October 15, 2026, or earlier if the FBI, FTC, reporting routes, or KinKeeper product availability materially changes.

Sources

1. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 IC3 Annual Report2026. Primary source for 2025 complaint, loss, age, crime-type, cryptocurrency, and AI-related complaint data. Accessed July 15, 2026.
2. Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Older Consumers 2024-2025December 2025. Consumer Sentinel reporting patterns, age comparisons, median reported losses, and reporting limitations.
3. FBI IC3, Criminals Use Generative Artificial Intelligence to Facilitate Financial FraudDecember 3, 2024. AI-enabled text, image, audio, and video fraud mechanisms and consumer guidance.
4. FTC, False alarm, real scamAugust 7, 2025. High-loss imposter patterns, contact and payment methods, and population-normalized reporting comparisons.
5. FinCEN, Analysis on Elder Financial ExploitationApril 18, 2024. Bank Secrecy Act reporting, suspicious activity, and the distinction between elder scams and elder theft.
6. FTC, Scammers use AI to enhance family emergency schemesMarch 20, 2023. Consumer guidance on voice cloning and independent verification.
7. SEC, NASAA, and FINRA, AI and Investment Fraud: Investor AlertJanuary 25, 2024. Guidance on AI-themed investment fraud, deepfake endorsements, registration checks, and family verification phrases.
8. CFPB, Protecting Older Adults from Fraud and Financial ExploitationUpdated March 10, 2026. Guidance for trusted contacts, banks, caregivers, and community organizations.
9. Federal financial regulators, Interagency Statement on Elder Financial ExploitationDecember 4, 2024. Governance, trusted contacts, holds, monitoring, and reporting.
10. FTC, What To Do if You Were ScammedCurrent guidance. Recovery steps by payment type, credential exposure, and device access.
11. Federal Trade Commission, IdentityTheft.govFederal identity-theft reporting and recovery-plan service.
12. FBI IC3, Elder FraudOfficial definition, reporting route, and National Elder Fraud Hotline details.
13. U.S. Department of Justice Elder Justice Initiative, Financial ExploitationDistinguishes financial abuse by known people from financial fraud by strangers and provides help resources.
14. FTC, People Reported Losing $3.5 Billion to Imposter Scams in 2025June 2026. Current all-age context for imposter scam losses and business and government impersonation.
15. KinKeeper, Elder Fraud & Scam Protection PlaybookJuly 2026. Companion course and source of the Pause, Verify another way, Share learning model; not used as external evidence.
16. Plaid, The New Identity Crisis: Rethinking Fraud in the AI EraFebruary 2026. Design and format reference supplied for the PDF; not used as evidence for KinKeeper claims.
17. FTC, How to handle unexpected calls that claim your money is at riskJanuary 2026. Guidance on independent contact information and fraudulent search advertisements.
18. Investor.gov, Relationship Investment Scams - Protect YourselfGuidance on relationship investment fraud, fake trading evidence, and AI-generated media.
19. FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2024 IC3 Annual ReportApril 2025. Comparison source for 2024 complaints and losses reported by people age 60+.